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This paper presents preliminary findings of the project “Analysing 
children’s implicit argumentation”. We propose to reconstruct implicit 
premises of children’s arguments within adult-children discussions 
in different settings, using the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) for 
the reconstruction of the inferential configuration of arguments. We 
show that sources of misunderstandings are more often than not 
due to misalignments of implicit premises between adults and 
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children; these misalignments concern material premises rather than the 
inferential-procedural level.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper intends to show that a careful reconstruction of children’s 
inferences and of their implicit premises helps to understand children’s 
contributions to dialogical argumentative activities. It also contributes to 
explain how children’s interventions might prima facie appear as 
reasoning “mistakes” to researchers, when in fact they are not, if one 
considers the child's perspective. Some of these “mistakes” depend on 
implicit starting points that are not shared by the interlocutors.  
Studies on argumentation in context largely concentrate on 
adults’ argumentation and prevailingly, though not exclusively, on 
professional contexts, such as juridical argumentation or political 
argumentation (see criticism in Schwarz & Baker, 2017). Our 
contribution aims to bring forward current studies on theories of 
argumentation in context, taking into account adult-children discussions. 
Our aim is also to contribute to cognitive developmental psychology and 
education through a closer examination of the dialogue-based reasoning 
processes between children and adults. 
Studies about children’s argumentative skills are abundant in 
psychology and education. These studies are characterized by conflicting 
findings. On the one hand, several authors have demonstrated with 
qualitative as well as quantitative methods that children are able to 
engage in argumentation in educational settings (e.g. Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn 
& Udell, 2003; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006; Migdalek et al., 2014, Schwarz & 
Baker, 2017) as well as in informal family conversations (Völzing, 1982; 
Pontecorvo & Sterponi, 2006; Bova & Arcidiacono, 2013). On the other 
hand, the literature that examines educational contexts seems to indicate 
that having children engage in an argumentative discussion in the 
classroom is not at all easy (see the discussions in: Muller Mirza & Buty, 
2015, Schwarz & Baker, 2017). Thus, if children seem to be able to 
produce argumentation in some settings, they also often seem to fall 
short of engaging in argumentative activities when asked to do so. 
Children’s argumentative skills, however, can be enhanced by 
appropriate educational interventions and this becomes the subject of 
2
studies on the design of argumentative situations in education 
(Andriessen & Schwarz, 2009). 
This conflicting evidence invites a better definition of what we 
expect when we talk of children’s argumentation; and a more nuanced 
understanding of children’s contributions to argumentative discussions 
in more or less formalized settings. In order to advance in this direction, 
we have chosen to study children’s inferences and their implicit starting 
points, understood within a framework of argumentation as a dialogical 
interaction. Such is the rationale behind the project “Analysing children’s 
implicit argumentation: reconstruction of procedural and material 
premises” (henceforth: ArgImp), funded by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation (contracts n. 100019-156690 and 100019_156690/2, 2015-
2018), to which the authors of this paper are collaborating1. This paper 
presents some of the preliminary findings of this project. 
The remaining of this paper will be organised as follows. In 
section 2, we will discuss the role of implicit in children’s argumentation 
and the theoretical instruments that are necessary in order to study it. 
Section 3 briefly outlines the different contexts in which our data on 
children’s argumentation have been collected. Section 4 analyses 
examples of children’s argumentation in which we intend to show how a 
careful reconstruction of implicit premises within inference is 
subservient to a better understanding of children’s starting points and of 
their arguments altogether. These results are discussed in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 has the function of drawing some preliminary 
conclusions, as well as of situating the present paper in the context of our 
broader research line on this topic. 
2. THEORETICAL STARTING POINTS OF THIS STUDY
Although a systematic reconstruction of children’s inferences in 
argumentative discussions has not been done yet, some studies on 
children’s argumentation clearly indicate that it is important to 
reconstruct implicit premises in order to understand the rationale 
behind children’s arguments, including those that appear prima facie 
weird, wrong, or of a low developmental level. For instance, Hundeide 
(1992, p. 143-144) reports that Norwegian children reason much better 
on a Piagetian task when the premise of their discourse involves 
snowballs and not white and black abstract circles. He comments:  
1 Applicants of this project are Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, Sara Greco, Antonio 
Iannaccone and Andrea Rocci. Josephine Convertini and Rebecca Schär 
participate as PhD students and have collected the data analysed in this paper. 
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The difficulty of a problem cannot be assessed from an analysis 
of the logical structure of the problem or question as such. We 
have instead to uncover the nesting of premises through 
microanalysis of message structure. Through this procedure it 
may be possible to identify alternative sequences of cognitive 
steps bound to different interpretive premises in relation to the 
‘same problem’ (...) an attempt at portraying thinking from the 
‘insider's point of view’ (Shotter, 1985). 
Through an analysis of naturally occurring talk between children in the 
4th grade at school, Anderson et al. (1997) convincingly show that 
children’s arguments might seem elliptical but often are “as informative 
as they needed to be” (Anderson et al., 1997, p.138). In fact, apparently 
missing premises are actually supplied either by the preceding 
discussion or by general principles, both available to a cooperative 
listener. 
These findings show that a careful reconstruction of inference 
should precede the evaluation of children’s arguments. This 
reconstruction should go hand in hand with a pragmatic account of what 
is happening in the here-and-now of the interaction, including preceding 
discussions and the expectations set by the context. In fact, research in 
psychology has shown that children are likely to give quite different 
meaning to the same questions asked in teaching or testing situations 
depending on the events and narratives involved (Donaldson, 1978), the 
setting and the relational context (Light & Perret-Clermont, 1989, 
Iannaccone & Perret-Clermont, 1993). As a result, they perform 
cognitively quite differently - a matter known to skilled clinicians 
(Grossen, 2014). Other studies show that there is a great deal of 
information that adults leave implicit and take for granted, albeit it is not 
necessarily accessible to children. Elbers (2004) draws attention to the 
importance of the conversational asymmetry that might lead to neglect 
the children's perspective and underestimate their skills. If the child is 
considered as a partner in conversation rather than as an object of 
research, a different account of children’s reasoning skills emerges 
(Pramling & Säljö, 2015; Mauritzson & Säljö, 2001). 
On the basis of these considerations, in our research on children’s 
argumentation, we have adopted a principle of pragmatic and inferential 
integrity. By pragmatic integrity, we mean that children’s argumentative 
contributions should not be considered as “isolated” argumentative 
productions (or products) to be evaluated independently from the 
interaction with other children and adults and from the context in which 
the interaction takes place. On the opposite, children’s arguments should 
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be seen as part of an ongoing discussion, which must be comprehensively 
taken into account in order to understand their inferences. In other 
words, we interpret argumentation from a dialogical viewpoint (Nonnon, 
1996, 2015; Plantin, 1996). For this reason, we assume a general pragma-
dialectical framework (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 2004) to 
analyse adult-children and child-child discussions as argumentative 
discussions. 
By inferential integrity, we mean that we intend to carefully 
reconstruct children’s contributions to argumentative discussions from 
an inferential viewpoint. Independently from what the adults’ 
expectations might be and how they react to children’s interventions, we 
carefully reconstruct the arguments proposed by the children, including 
their implicit premises. Following Anderson et al. (1997), we assume that 
a careful reconstruction of implicit premises might shed light on what 
children are trying to do with their interventions and what types of 
starting points they take for granted. 
Our analysis will be guided by the Argumentum Model of Topics 
(AMT, Rigotti and Greco Morasso, 2010) for the study of inference and 
the reconstruction of implicit premises2. The AMT offers the advantage to 
clearly distinguish different types of premises making up an argument 
scheme. A first component, called inferential-procedural component, 
represents the inferential principle on which the argument is based. The 
procedural component includes the locus, i.e. the relation that is at the 
origin of inference (e.g. cause to effect or effect to cause). Moreover, at the 
level of how inference is constructed, it includes the specific inferential 
rule (maxim) derived by the locus and used as an often implicit premise 
in argumentation (e.g. “if the cause is present, the effect will be present”). 
Real life arguments, however, are not only based on abstract inferential 
principles; they need to be grounded in a material component, made up 
of premises linked to the cultural and contextual background of the 
interlocutors. The AMT distinguishes these two types of premises and 
allows to explain how they interact in argumentation. 
Distinguishing between inferential-procedural and material 
premises is particularly important in the context of the present research. 
On the one hand, in fact, this allows to understand where potential 
problems of children’s arguments might lie, without confusing the logical 
form of their reasoning and the inferential starting points with the 
2 The fact that analysing implicit content might shed light on educational 
practices has also been noted by Macagno and Kostantinidou (2013), although 
these authors have analysed adolescents’ discursive productions. 
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material-contextual premises. These latter represent the children’s view 
on the considered issue, their knowledge and expectations. 
We expect that a careful reconstruction of young children’s 
implicit material premises will be important to understand their starting 
points and how they differ from an adult’s expectations (and vice versa). 
The reconstruction of implicit starting points in this sense connects the 
reconstruction of inference with the reconstruction of the pragmatics of 
the conversation: in fact, some implicit premises might be explained not 
as missing parts of an argument but as parts that are left unsaid because 
they are considered common knowledge. 
3. EMPIRICAL DATA
The data discussed in this paper have been collected within the ArgImp 
project in two different settings3, which both involve adult-children 
argumentation. A first context is unstructured (‘spontaneous’) 
discussions in a family context. A second context is made of conversations 
taking place during semi-structured play activities in a kindergarten. 
Albeit different, these two settings share some common traits that make 
the two corpora homogeneous. First, they both include preschool 
children (from 2 to 6 years); second, the conversation often includes not 
only children but also adults. In the case of family discussions, the adults 
normally include one or both parents, other relatives and sometimes the 
researcher, who is asked by children to take part in the discussion or play 
with them. In the case of play activities, the children are interacting with 
the researcher who has proposed the task to them. 
The data on everyday conversations in a family setting has been 
collected in 12 families in three different linguistic regions of 
Switzerland. No specific task was given to the families; they were free to 
choose what to do. In fact, our goal was to observe natural occurring 
discussion in the families’ everyday life. Sometimes, the children asked 
the researcher to play with them. However, we noticed that the children 
did not see the presence of an extraneous person at the family place as 
intrusive: more often than not, they interpreted the researcher as a friend 
of their parents who was visiting them. 
3 Within the ArgImp project, we also had two further corpora available. First, we 
could benefit of a collection of interactions based on revised Piagetian interviews 
to children of different ages, collected by the University of Neuchâtel in over 
thirty years of research. Second, we had a collection of data concerning informal 
family discussions that we used as a pilot-study before starting the project. 
However, we are not primarily referring to these data in the present paper. 
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The data on semi-structured play activities have been collected in 
two different kindergartens, the first one located in the French speaking 
part of Switzerland and the second one in Italy. The researcher reached 
the children in their usual play room at the kindergarten. She introduced 
specific activities, which were intended to make them discuss and reason. 
Most of these activities were inspired by Piaget (1974) or from the 
foundation La main à la pâte4. They were activities of construction based 
on building blocks or other toys. Each activity included a semi-structured 
task for the children to complete. More details about the specific activities 
will be given in section 4. 
Family conversations were audio recorded; play activities at the 
kindergarten were both audio recorded and video recorded. In both 
cases, the researchers were present during the interaction. The data have 
been transcribed according to a slightly adapted version of the notation 
system proposed by Traverso (1999). Because all the extracts analysed 
in this paper are in languages other than English, we provide the original 
text together with our own translation in section 4. 
4. ANALYSIS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE ARGIMP PROJECT
In this section, we will discuss the main findings obtained so far in the 
ArgImp project, concerning the analysis of children’s partially implicit 
inferences as contributions to an argumentative discussion. 
For reasons of space, we have chosen only three examples, which 
have an illustrative and representative function. They have been chosen 
in accordance with two main criteria. First, we have chosen 
representative cases, in the sense that the dynamics observed in these 
cases are also present in other examples found in our corpora. Second, 
we have included both naturally occurring family conversations and 
semi-structured play activities in the kindergarten in order to show that 
it is possible to retrace similar dynamics in different settings. 
In line with Anderson et al. (1997), we found that children’s 
arguments are often elliptic, because there are implicit premises and 
sometimes the standpoint is also implicit. In AMT terms, what is often 
made explicit is the datum, i.e. the factual material premise supporting 
the standpoint in the framework of an inferential configuration that is 
often largely implicit. This is not different from what happens with adults’ 
conversations, in which a pragmatic principle implies that what is taken 
4 See http://www.fondation-lamap.org/en/international, last accessed 24. 09. 
2017. 
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for granted is superfluous and should not be repeated, as this would go 
against a cooperative principle in conversation (Grice, 1975). 
In particular, in AMT terms, we found that maxims, i.e. inferential-
procedural starting points, are always left implicit. Material starting 
points such as endoxa might be made explicit by children if they are 
controversial (e.g. when they are challenged by adults), which confirms 
the findings by Anderson et al. (1997). 
Moreover, in the ArgImp project, we found that often, in front of 
a child’s inference that comes to the “wrong” conclusion (or to a 
conclusion that is interpreted as “wrong” by the adults who are taking 
part in the conversation), the reason for this is to be found in the material 
premises, and particularly in the endoxa. More often than not, in fact, the 
procedural-inferential starting points are applied correctly and are based 
on a principle of support that is acceptable. In contrast, the children’s 
endoxa, sometimes, refer to a “worldview” that is partial or in the course 
of development, or simply is different from what the researcher or the 
adult was expecting. 
A first illustration of this kind of result has been discussed in 
Greco (2016). In this work, the example is given of a child slightly older 
than two years, who maintains that the bottom part of an apple 
(remnants of calyx) is a bee because it stings. We know that this is not 
true; but what is interesting is to understand where the child’s “mistake” 
lies. The principle (locus from definition) is correctly applied and we could 
agree with the definitional maxim stating that “If x has got the specific 
and exclusive characteristic of a species A, then x is an A”. However, the 
endoxon, namely that “The specific and exclusive characteristic of the 
species ‘bee’ is ‘stinging’ (all that stings is a bee)” is based on a partial 
view of reality, probably depending on the child’s limited experience of 
this subject. It is an endoxon that will be arguably revised over time. From 
a psychological perspective, it is very interesting to distinguish the child's 
reasoning (successfully making an inference) from his factual knowledge 
(about bees and insects). 
This kind of dynamics is often present in our data and represents 
a central finding of the ArgImp project. We will now discuss three 
examples taken from the corpora introduced in section 3. 
The first example is taken from the corpus of conversations in a 
family setting. The discussion was registered in the Swiss German 
speaking region of Switzerland in February 2016. The participants of this 
discussion are Levin, who is three years and two months old, and his 
mother. They talk about the researcher (R.) who visited them at their 
home. The conversation took place immediately after the researcher 
arrived at the families’ home. The mother asks the researcher whether 
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she would like to have a cup of tea, since the mother and Levin were 
having tea and biscuits as the researcher arrived. During the preparation 
of the researcher’s tea, Levin starts talking. 
Turn Speaker Transcript Our Translation 
1 Levin d R. wett äu ä chli tee (1.0) R. also wants some tea (1.0)
2 Mother m:hm m:hm 
3 Levin die do= these ones= 
4 Mother und no es Tuc ((keks)) 
chaschere äno geh 
and a Tuc ((cookie)) you can 
give her one too 
5 Levin es↑ a↑ 
6 Mother es Tuc (3.0) a Tuc (3.0) 
7 Levin nid ade erwachsnig 
gschider 
better not to adults 
8 Mother momol die sind ä für die 
erwachsnige 
yes yes they are for adults too 
Table 1 – The TUC® case. Participants: Levin 3:2 years, mother 
Levin transforms this exchange into an argumentative discussion 
at turn 7, when he problematizes his mother’s request to give a TUC® 
cookie to the researcher (turn 4). 
Figure 1 – AMT representation of the TUC® example (Levin’s 
argumentation) 
Endoxon: TUC® are not 
made for adults 
Datum: R. is an 
adult 
First conclusion – Minor premise 1: TUC® are 
not made for R. 
Final conclusion: I should better 
not give a TUC® to R. 
Maxim: If something is 
not made for X, it 






Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the AMT analysis of 
Levin’s argumentation in extract 1. On the right, the procedural premises 
of this argument are represented. In this case, the argument is based on 
a locus from ontological implications (Rigotti and Greco, forth.) a relation 
between the nature of an entity (in this case, cookies) what this nature 
implies, namely the end for which this entity has been designed. In the 
AMT, the locus from ontological implications is part of the category of 
definitional loci. Some definitional procedures derive from the purpose of 
an object (e.g. when we say that a yoga mat is a type of mat designed for 
practicing yoga, we give a definition based on the goal of the yoga mat). 
The ontological implication on which this argument is built derives from 
this kind of functional definition. 
The maxim, in this case, is formulated in a negative variant: “if 
something is not made for x, it should not be given to x”. We have 
reconstructed this maxim, which is actually implicit. Speculatively, we 
could imagine that the child might have derived this maxim, indirectly, 
starting from cases in which he is denied access to things that are “not for 
children” – such as alcohol, just to mention an obvious example in the 
domain of food and beverages. In any case, this principle, per se, might be 
correctly applied, despite some limitations, in a series of everyday 
situations: think for example of cars, which are not meant for children to 
drive. 
Whilst the maxim, thus, can be correctly applied at least in some 
domains, the material premises of this argument – in particular the 
endoxon – require a more nuanced appreciation. The datum “R is an 
adult” is not explicitly said by the child, arguably because it is visible to 
everybody in the here-and-now of the conversation. The endoxon is made 
explicit by the child as a reaction to his mother’s request (turns 4 and 6): 
“[TUC® Cookies are] better not for adults”. Apparently, this endoxon is 
not shared by the mother; although it is true that there are types of 
sweets and cakes that are made especially for children (in terms of 
marketing, packaging, etc.), for the mother this is not the case of TUC® 
cookies5. In this sense, example 1 is exemplary of a situation that we often 
find in our data: the child’s argument appears “wrong” not because of a 
logical mistake but because an endoxon is different from what an adult 
would expect. 
A similar dynamics is to be found in a different situation, taken 
from the corpus of semi-structured play activities and recorded in 
November 2016 in a kindergarten in Italy. The children are introduced to 
5 The mother might be aware that TUC® cookies as not advertised as children’s 
cookies. 
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an activity, inspired by Piaget (1974), in which they have to play with 
LEGO®. In particular, the researcher has asked a couple of children (a 6 
years old male and a 5 years old female) to build a bridge. She has 
explained that two friends are waiting on their cars on opposite edges of 
a lake; they want to meet and they need a bridge to do so. The two friends 
are LEGO® characters, a blue and a red one respectively. The former is 
taller than the latter. All the materials have been placed on a little table, 
around which children are free to move. The lake has been cut out from 
blue construction paper. 
Extract 2 reproduces the final moments of the discussion. After 
the children have completed the task, the researcher asks them to explain 
what they have been doing. After some discussion on the task, one of the 
children (Max) makes a digression and talks about the LEGO® figures that 
they have been playing with (see table 2). 
Turn Speaker Transcript Our Translation 
1 Max questo qui ((prende in 
mano la sagoma lego 
di colore rosso, gli 
cade e lo riprende in 
mano e lo solleva)) 
questo qui è una 
femmina è un bimbo 
perché è più basso di 
lei (1.0) 
this one ((takes the red lego 
figure into his hand, the figure 
falls down and he takes it into 
his hand again and lifts it up)) 
this one is a female a child 
because it’s shorter than her 
(1.0) 
2 Researcher ah:: ah:: 
3 Max questo qui ((indica il 
lego di colore rosso)) 
this one ((indicates the red lego 
figure)) 
4 Researcher per l’altezza↑ because of the height↑ 
5 Max um um ((suono usato 
in senso affermativo)) 
um um ((affirming)) 
Table 2 – The LEGO® example 
Although the text is partially ambiguous, it is clear that Max is 
comparing two LEGO® figures. He makes a consideration based on the 
size of one of the two characters, which is smaller than the other one; and 
argues that therefore it must be “a female, a child”, because “it’s shorter 
than her”. Two different interpretations are given – the LEGO® figure 
might be a female or a child (or both: a female child, this is not clear from 
the data)6 because it is shorter than the other figure. In general, this is a 
6 In the following of the conversation, the researcher picks up one of these 
interpretations, namely that the character is a female; and the children confirm 
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definitional argument relying on size as an indicator of something else. At 
the level of endoxa, we would have: “children are smaller than adults”, 
which is generally acceptable (up to a certain age, and with nuanced 
individual variations); or “female persons are smaller than males”, which 
is not so obvious and not valid for each individual case. If the second 
interpretation is correct, then the child is adopting an endoxon that is not 
correctly describing all possible male-female combinations in terms of 
height. However, even if partial, this endoxon might come from the child’s 
personal experience (e.g. his mother being shorter than his father?) or 
from children’s books or other cultural representations. In any case, once 
again, although endoxa might be discussed, the inferential-procedural 
dynamics of the argument is correct, which tells us that children’s 
arguments, at least in some cases, even when they appear as “bizarre” or 
come to a wrong conclusion, are not necessarily wrong altogether. A clue 
to further understand children’s argumentative skills and their 
contributions to an argumentative discussion seems to lie in a nuanced 
and careful consideration of material premises. 
The third example we have selected also comes from the corpus 
of semi-structured play activities and has been recorded in a 
kindergarten in Italy in November 2016. This example is particularly 
interesting, in our view, because it shows that sometimes a child’s refusal 
to respond to the adult’s task is due to a misalignment of implicit 
premises. 
The task in this case is to build a tunnel with building blocks, in 
such a way that toy cars can drive through it. The children are sitting 
around a table on which four pictures representing tunnels, some LEGO® 
bricks and a red toy car are placed. At the beginning of the interaction 
(which we are not reporting in table 3), the researcher shows the pictures 
to the children; at some point, she talks about the red toy car. In previous 
interactions, the children referred to this same car as “Fireman Sam’s 
car”, alluding to an animated character that they probably know because 
of TV series7. Arguably, the red car “looks like” Sam’s car because of its 
red colour; Sam and his fellow firemen, in fact, drive a red truck and a red 
car in the TV series. In this interaction, the adult researcher picks up this 
it. However, we are not commenting on this part, because this confirmation has 
been guided by the researcher’s interpretation. 
7 Fireman Sam is an animated comedy for children originally produced and 
broadcast in the UK; the series has been translated to Italian and broadcast in 
Italy since 2006. In the original story, Sam lives in the fictional village of 
Pontypandy (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fireman_Sam, last visited 
September 2017). 
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interpretation, although she is not familiar with the world of fireman 
Sam. Therefore, whilst introducing this new task, she presents the red toy 
car as “Sam’s car” and the task as “building a tunnel for Sam’s city”. 
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Turn Speaker Transcript Our Translation 
1 Researcher e ci sono le luci dentro il 
tunnel perché altrimenti (.) 
non si vede niente è buio 
no dentro il tunnel (.) se 
non ci sono le luci non 
riusciamo a vedere (.) 
allora visto che avete visto 
il tunnel io vi ho portato 
qua la macchinina di Sam il 
pompiere ((avvicina la 
macchinina ai bambini e 
Mia la prende in mano)) 
che la conoscete tutti e vi 
chiedo di costruire il suo 
tunnel ((prende la 
macchinina in mano)) 
allora il tunnel per essere 
utile 
and there are lights in the 
tunnel because otherwise 
(.) you cannot see anything 
it’s dark inside the tunnel is 
it (.) if there are no lights 
we won’t be able to see (.) 
so since you have seen the 
tunnel I brought to you 
fireman Sam’s car ((holds 
the car closer to the 
children and Mia takes it 
into her hands)) that you 
all know and I’ll ask you to 
construct his tunnel 
((takes the car into her 
hands)) so the tunnel to be 
useful 
2 Mia deve passare sotto it must go under it 
3 Researcher deve passare [sotto it must go [under it 
4 Tom       [ma ma] ma ma ma 
ma la città di Sam il 
pompiere u un c'ha u un u 
un c'ha un tunnel 
    [but but] but but but but 
the city of fireman Sam 
does n no does n no not 
have a tunnel 
5 Researcher ed è per quello che noi lo 
facciamo perché non ce 
l'ha (.) è per quello che noi 
lo facciamo (.) vai siediti 
Tom ((la ricercatrice fa 
sedere Tom)) però bisogna 
stare bene attenti che la 
nostra macchina riesca a 
passare sotto il tunnel 
perché se non riesce a 
passarci il tunnel 
dobbiamo rifarlo eh quindi 
state bene attenti che 
riesca a passarci vi lascio le 
costruzioni qua ((avvicina 
le costruzioni a bambini)) 
e poi vengo a vedere il 
tunnel che avete fatto 
and this is why we are 
making it because it does 
not have one (.) this is why 
we are making it (.) go sit 
down Tom ((makes Tom 
sit down)) but we need to 
pay attention that our car 
will be able to go under the 
tunnel because if it does 
not succeed going under 
the tunnel we need to 
remake it so therefore pay 
attention that it can go 
under it i let you the 
building blocks here ((puts 
the building blocks near 
the children)) and 
afterwards i come to see 
the tunnel you made 
Table 3 – Fireman Sam 
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The discussion about how to solve the task begins at turns 2-3. 
However, in turn 4, one of the children (Tom) immediately reacts saying 
that Sam’s city does not have a tunnel. The presentation of the task by the 
researcher is not necessarily argumentative; she presents the aim of the 
activity (constructing a tunnel) as “constructing his (i.e. Sam’s) tunnel”. 
Arguably, Tom interprets the adjective “suo” (his) in such a way that he 
understands “the tunnel that is in Sam’s city”. This is not literally what 
the adult has said but is a reasonable interpretation of her words. Tom, 
then, reinterprets the construction of the tunnel as a means to faithfully 
reproduce the city where Sam lives and works. From his reaction at turn 
4, we might say that Tom interprets the presentation of the task by the 
researcher as a form of means-end argumentation. The researcher’s 
argumentation according to Tom’s interpretation can be reconstructed 
as in figure 2. 
Figure 2 – AMT representation of Fireman Sam’s example 
(researcher’s argumentation according to Tom) 
Tom’s objection at turn 4 stems from the fact that he does not 
share the datum proposed (or allegedly proposed) by the adult: Sam’s 
city does not have a tunnel. In this sense, because the child is more 
Endoxon: The shared 
goal of the interaction is 
faithfully reproducing 
Sam’s city 
Datum: Building a tunnel 
permits to faithfully 
reproducing Sam’s city 
First conclusion – Minor premise 1: Building 
a tunnel permits to reach a shared goal  
Final conclusion: It is 
reasonable to build a tunnel 
Maxim: Only if an action 
allows to reach a shared 
goal, it is reasonable to 
do it 
Locus from the 
final cause 
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knowledgeable than the adult about the details of Sam’s world, there is 
an asymmetry of knowledge that is reversed (contrary to what one would 
expect): the child knows more than the adult. Consequently, in response 
to Tom’s remark, the researcher reacts (turn 5) by rephrasing the goal of 
the interaction (endoxon). She says that they are building a tunnel 
precisely because Sam’s city does not have one. In this way, the 
researcher modifies the endoxon: the goal is not faithfully reproducing 
Sam’s city but completing it. This means that the researcher has 
understood Tom’s objection and reacts in this way in order to correct the 
implicit material premise (endoxon) that Tom assumed was her premise. 
5. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER OPENINGS
Two main aspects emerge from this analysis. A first aspect is that the 
reconstruction of children’s inferences and, in particular, implicit 
premises, contributes to a nuanced understanding of children’s 
argumentative skills. In particular, findings from the ArgImp project 
show that isolating material premises from procedural premises permits 
to identify possible sources of misunderstandings and arguments that 
come to a wrong conclusion. In the case of children’s argumentation, we 
often note (as in examples 1 and 2) that arguments are correct from an 
inferential-procedural viewpoint (see also Convertini, in preparation), 
but they rely on endoxa that only partially reproduce adults' 
understandings of reality. Example 3 shows that adults’ implicit endoxa 
are not always clear to the children. But more generally, it shows that it 
is not simply children’s endoxa that are “weird” but adults' in some ways 
are also. In fact, there is a problem of perspectivation, and one should 
take into account that also adults’ implicit starting points might be 
questioned (or difficult to understand) in conversation. This result is in 
line with findings by Pramling and Säljö (2015). In their study of 
Piagetian interviews, these authors show that taking into account the 
situatedness of the conversation (including adults’ implicit starting 
points) might change the interpretation of children's argumentation. All 
this suggests that, in order to improve argumentation (for example in 
educational settings), a careful consideration of both adults’ and 
children’s implicit premises would be necessary; and without forgetting 
that these premises are likely to change while the child (and sometimes 
even the adult) deepens his or her understanding of the issue (Miserez 
Caperos, 2017). 
From a viewpoint of children’s argumentative skills, example 3 
also shows that Tom was able to reconstruct a possible means-end 
argumentation allegedly proposed by the adult. He was able to assume 
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the endoxon that he thinks the adult has proposed and reason from that 
starting point. 
A second aspect that emerges from example 3 concerns the fact 
that children (in this case, Tom) are able to discuss the meaningfulness of 
a task proposed by an adult. Although this is not the subject of the present 
paper, it deserves some discussion. In fact, Tom’s reaction in turn 4 is 
indirectly criticizing (or questioning at the least) the adult’s proposal. In 
this case, as it is visible in the following of extract 3, the adult does pick 
up the child’s suggestion and modifies the goal of the activity following 
up on this criticism8. In other cases, however, we have shown that 
children’s attempts to question an adult’s proposal are not taken up by 
the adults participating in the interaction; for example, Greco, Mehmeti 
and Perret-Clermont (2017) show that when children question a 
discussion issue proposed by an adult, or try to open a new discussion 
issue, they might not be allowed to do so by the adult (for many reasons, 
including the possibility of an adult's lack of decentration). This kind of 
findings, which are emerging in the ArgImp project, brought us to 
consider more closely the notion of “discussion issue” in relation to the 
freedom rule of an argumentative discussion (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst, 2004). In its original formulation, the freedom rule states 
that parties to an (ideal) argumentative discussion should be free to 
advance standpoints and arguments. We find, however, that one of the 
limitations that might be imposed to children is due to the fact that they 
are not free to open argumentative discussions by proposing new issues 
to the adults attention (or to challenge an adult’s issue). When the issues 
proposed by children deviate from what is expected, or go against the 
adult’s expectations, they are often “suffocated” or left apart in the adult-
led discussion. We think that carefully observing how issues are raised or 
refused (not always argumentatively) and who is legitimate to do so 
might open new avenues for the study of children’s argumentation in 
educational contexts (see Greco, Mehmeti & Perret-Clermont, 2017; 
Greco, 2016; Schär, in preparation). This also opens the debate on a 
reconsideration of the teacher's role in argumentative discussions: if 
"teaching" is understood only as a teacher-guided top down activity and 
"learning" as acquiring the knowledge that a teacher "has", then the 
promotion of discussions in classrooms might lead to conflicting 
8 This example suggests that a further step in this research could be the 
reconstruction of pragmatic inferences made by adults in order to reconstruct 
the meaning of children’s arguments. In some cases, pragmatic inferences might 
break down and this would explain where adults do not understand children 
(and vice versa). 
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requirements for the students. This might explain also why sometimes it 
is so difficult to promote argumentation in the classroom (Schwarz and 
Baker, 2017). Instead, if the teacher's role is understood as that of a 
mediator (Greco, Mehmeti & Perret- Clermont, 2017) in a triangular 
relation with students and knowledge issues, then a space can open for 
critical discussion amongst the interlocutors. However, the 
characteristics of this space and the precise role of the teacher and the 
students deserve more research. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we have shown some exemplary findings of the 
ArgImp project, focusing on how the reconstruction of children’s 
inferences within an adult-children discussion (in different settings) 
might contribute to the study of children’s argumentation. The 
systematic analysis of a growing collection of episodes of children’s 
argumentation shows that distinguishing between procedural and 
material premises (as allowed by the AMT) provides useful insights into 
what the problems might be in their interaction with adults. In particular, 
material premises explain possible misalignments between adults and 
children in terms of implicit starting points. 
These findings contribute to the research stream on 
argumentation in context, by illuminating types of contextual settings 
that are still underinvestigated: namely, contexts in which very small 
children (under 6 years) participate to the discussion, including semi-
structured play activities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Argument may be broadly defined as an inference with an intention. If 
viewed/analysed in a dialogical context, such intention needs to be 
considered in relation to a dialogue goal. The authors aim to “interpret 
argumentation from a dialogical viewpoint”, thus it is expected that 
dialogue goals/intentions are taken into consideration. 
This potential relationship between individual dialogue moves 
and commonly achieved goals has been extensively studied in the field of 
educational argumentation both in face-to-face (e.g. Nussbaum & 
Kardash, 2005; Felton, Garcia-Mila & Gilabert, 2009) and in computer-
supported collaborative learning environments (e.g. Clark et al., 2007; 
Baker, 2016). The main problem that these studies face is that several 
coding schemes of dialogue moves exist, which reveals the lack of a 
commonly shared pragmatic model to analyse 
interaction/argumentation in context. Argumentation Theory (AT) could 
contribute to educational research in this sense, providing for example a 
top-down list of argumentation dialogue types meaningful in the 
educational context or even a top-down list of teachers and students 
dialogue moves that clearly relate to promoting argumentation dialogue 
in the classroom. Both goals are still unachieved. 
2. SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
What Greco et al. (this volume) propose is to use AMT (Argumentum 
Model of Topics), which is a structural analytical framework of 
arguments, to analyse and re-construct children’s inferences, with a 
particular focus on endoxa that are for the authors types of inferential 
rules based on material components. According to the authors, it is 
these 
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endoxa we as researchers need to focus on if we want to better 
understand children’s inferences and why sometimes they are not 
correctly understood or judged by adults. 
Although an explicit definition of endoxon is not given by the 
authors, I assume they refer to the Aristotelian term. For Aristotle, endoxa 
are “these that are thought by everyone or the majority or the wisemen 
and by the ones who know and think everything or the majority or the 
most part of the things” (Topics, 100b, 21-23, my transl.). Put simpler, 
endoxa are the generally accepted opinions, but not the self-proven 
principles that are the prota and alithi (first and true), as for example are 
the mathematical axioms. In this sense, endoxa are products either of 
logical argumentation or they are just opinions (in the sense of Platonic 
doxes). 
In any case endoxa are different than topoi or loci (maxims) and 
it is a good idea to distinguish them. It is also a good idea to consider that 
there is a structural connection between them, as it was first proposed by 
Abelard (see Macagno & Walton, 2006). Moreover, “keeping endoxon and 
maxim separated allows for sharper questions” (Rocci, 2017, p. 61). 
However, what for Rigotti and Greco (2010) is mainly a semantic 
question1, for other scholars (e.g. Walton, 2007) it is a dialectical issue 
that takes into consideration all types of semantic relations between the 
premises2. It is this dialectical element that it is necessary when analysing 
arguments in dialogical contexts, especially in education where common 
knowledge cannot be taken for granted and knowledge construction is 
the aim of argumentative interactions (Baker, 2003). 
In any dialogical context, we cannot presuppose that 
interlocutors share the same starting points, and even less in education, 
especially with young children. Then the goal of educators becomes the 
one of accompanying the less-knowledgeable into constructing more 
scientific, evidence-based theories that would replace or complete the 
existing intuitive theories, what educational scientists call conceptual 
change. The relation between argumentation and conceptual change has 
been broadly studied in education and with children in particular (e.g. 
Duschl & Osborne, 2002; Berland & McNeill, 2010; Venville & Dawson, 
2010). Helping children make explicit their own theories about 
1 Which is perfectly fine but again we need a pragmatic model behind, such as 
Levinson’s scalar implicatures (see Davis, 1998). 
2 Walton treats endoxa as premises, making their re-construction easy and 
accessible for many educational researchers (see for example Duschl, 2007; 
Macagno & Konstantinidou, 2013; Ibraim, Mendonça & Justi, 2013; Rapanta & 
Walton, 2016a, b).  
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phenomena, often intuitive, and having them re-construct or co-
construct new theories, more scientific ones, has been the object of a vast 
literature in argumentation and education (e.g. von Aufschnaiter et al., 
2008; Kuhn, 2010). Moreover, most of the studies proposed take into 
account the dialectical element of interaction proposing concrete ways of 
how children may produce better arguments, counter-arguments, and 
rebuttals (e.g. Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Erduran, Simon, & Osborne, 2004; 
Leitão, 2007). 
3. PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN ARGUMENTATION
Developmental research literature suggests that children by 3 years of 
age understand and generate the principle components of an argument 
(Stein & Albro, 2001), but their arguments are still not elaborated 
(Golder, 1992) or strategic (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). In this sense, I agree 
with Greco et al. (this volume) that the quality of children’s arguments 
must not only be judged in terms of “logical” structure, as it is common to 
have apparently correct argument structures, but based on incomplete, 
insufficient or not-as-much acceptable knowledge. This is the case of 
“pseudoevidence” (Kuhn, 1991), personal or idiosyncratic arguments 
(Ceballos, Correa & Batista, 2002), or “paralogisms” (Rapanta & Walton, 
2016a, b). In educational contexts, it is fairly easy to judge what type of 
prior knowledge used is not as much persuasive or adequate because it 
lacks certain scientific standards related to the disciplinary subject. 
Below an example of my current corpus data of a 12-year old arguing 
about whether Mediterranean diet should be recommendable or not: 
(1) On the one hand I agree with the statement (that
Mediterranean diet is recommendable) because it
contains, in percentages, the correct portions. On the
other hand I do not agree because the portions are
extremely reduced so most people who follow it are
undoubtedly hungry. In short, this diet, in my opinion,
should be practiced, but with more portions of
everything. Example: I think that eating only one or
two spoonfuls of rice in one meal is very little, should
be the double.
In the above example, the 12-year old child gave an expert-like 
opinion regarding what the correct amount of food should be, but 
obviously she did not use any subject-related knowledge for her 
judgment. The argument may be strong from a structural point of view, 
but weak from a content point of view. Nonetheless, at a pre-school age, 
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which is the children’s age in Greco et al.’s study, it is difficult to define 
what the expected or “correct” knowledge should be, which would 
subsequently define the quality of arguments as implied by the authors. 
Going deeper in each one of the presented examples, the first one is an 
example of practical reasoning in which the child concludes that he 
should not give the cookie to the researcher. The explicit premise that “it 
is better not to give this type of cookie to an adult” perfectly serves the 
goal of the child not to give the cookie (and subsequently keep it for him). 
Whether this premise (endoxon in Greco et al. analysis) is successful or 
not depends on the goals of the interlocutors. In the case of Levin (the 
child) the premise is highly relevant to his goal (if the cookie is not for 
adults, then he shouldn’t give it), sufficient (the researcher is an adult), 
but maybe not totally acceptable, as he fails to answer the dialectical 
question “How do you know that (this cookie is not for adults)?”, which 
is the basis of metacognitive development according to Kuhn (2000). In 
the case of Levin’s mother, she just cancels Levin’s premise by stating that 
“they are for adults too” imposing her own goal (offering the cookie) 
without any argumentation offered from her part. Thus, she doesn’t 
support Levin in this argumentative effort, if his refusal to give the cookie 
was seen as such. For Stein & Miller (1991), children from the age of 3 
have the ability to construct counter-arguments in the way that Levin did, 
but these arguments are not necessarily strategic from an argumentative 
point of view: they are mainly used to satisfy personal desires. 
In the other two examples, we have two cases of arguments from 
analogy. In one case, Max (the child) claims that the Lego figure is a 
female (or a child) because it is shorter than the other Lego. Clearly, as 
the authors also state, this analogy is based on the child’s personal 
experience confirming that females (or children) are shorter than males 
(or adults). In the other case, Tom (the child) continues the analogy 
previously co-constructed with the other children, as mentioned by the 
authors, in which the red toy car used as part of the task “was” Sam 
fireman’s car (a cartoon’s character). So, after the researcher’s invitation 
to build a tunnel for fireman Sam’s car, Tom counter-argues her by saying 
that “but the city of fireman Sam does not have a tunnel”. The implicit 
claim would be “thus, we shouldn’t construct a tunnel”, which would go 
against the researcher’s goal, requiring the children to complete the task. 
The researcher instead of responding to Tom’s counter-argument, thus 
helping him develop his argumentative reasoning, she uses a weak 
rebuttal “because Sam’s city doesn’t have a tunnel, we need to make one”, 




In summary, I believe that all the children’s arguments presented in 
Greco et al. study are considerable efforts in terms of the quality of 
argumentative reasoning, based on developmental research literature 
(Stein & Miller, 1991; Stein & Albro, 1991; Golder, 1992). Maybe it is the 
adults’ weakness in adequately responding to these arguments, or simply 
the difference in their intentions, that makes children’s arguments look 
insufficient? 
From a theory of mind point of view, analogical reasoning, 
present in two of the three examples in Greco et al. paper, enables 
children’s early inferential sensitivity to some mental states associated 
with action (Malle, 2002). Thus, it would be interesting to see the 
relations of pre-school children’s endoxa with theories of mind 
developed in the early years of life. 
From an AT perspective, it would also be interesting to see the 
relation (in terms of contribution) between children’s inferences and the 
dialogue goal, when this dialogue is authentic and not serving some 
specific researchers needs such as carrying concrete cognitive tasks, as in 
the last two examples mentioned in Greco et al. 
Last but not least, from an argumentation and education point of 
view, any transfer of observations made at a pre-school age to formal 
education settings may be dangerous, if not meaningless. On the other 
hand, if the goal is to better understand how argumentation skills are 
developed in the early childhood and how we can support this process 
applying AT models and tools, research in this field is certainly promising. 
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